Negotiated Tax Havens

60 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2018 Last revised: 2 Oct 2019

See all articles by Kevin Markle

Kevin Markle

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business

Leslie A. Robinson

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; Dartmouth College - Accounting

Date Written: September 30, 2019

Abstract

The intersection of state aid and international tax has acquired a high profile in Europe. In response, disclosure policies are being proposed. With no empirical evidence, these policies are predicated on rhetoric that pervasive practices by host country governments unfairly benefit foreign-owned companies. Using several novel data sources on tax relief granted in the EU, we find that both domestic- and foreign-owned companies benefit from tax concessions. Our evidence that tax avoidance is a joint production function of business and government suggests that any jurisdiction can operate as a tax haven for a company willing to negotiate.

Keywords: tax policy, FDI, state aid, competition, foreign-owned

JEL Classification: H25, F23

Suggested Citation

Markle, Kevin and Robinson, Leslie, Negotiated Tax Havens (September 30, 2019). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 3280683, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3280683 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3280683

Kevin Markle (Contact Author)

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/people/profile/profile.aspx?id=1643762

Leslie Robinson

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Dartmouth College - Accounting ( email )

100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-4018 (Phone)

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