Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms

Abstract

Recent Spanish tax reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting in substantial tax differentials. We use individual-level information from Social Security records over a period of one decade. Conditional on moving, taxes have a significant effect on location choice. A one percent increase in the net of tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to that region by 1.7 percentage points. Focusing on the stock of top-taxpayers, we estimate an elasticity of the number of top taxpayers with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.85. Using this elasticity, a theoretical model implies that the mechanical increase in tax revenue due to higher tax rates is larger than the loss in tax revenue from the outflow of migration.

Keywords: Migration, Taxes, Mobility, Rich, Fiscal Decentralization

JEL Classification: H24, H31, H73, J61, R23