Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion

47 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2018 Last revised: 9 Mar 2020

See all articles by Ariel Ezrachi

Ariel Ezrachi

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law

Date Written: November 10, 2018

Abstract

Algorithmic collusion is a hot topic within antitrust circles in Europe, US and beyond. But some economists downplay algorithmic collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. This paper responds to these criticisms by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion isn’t only possible, but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers.

Keywords: Competition Law, Antitrust, Algorithms, Tacit Collusion, Algorithmic Tacit Collusion, Collusion, Hub and Spoke

JEL Classification: D43, D50, D81, K21, L1, L13, L16, O30

Suggested Citation

Ezrachi, Ariel and Stucke, Maurice E., Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion (November 10, 2018). University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 366; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/2019; 17 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 217 (2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3282235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3282235

Ariel Ezrachi (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 W. Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-9816 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mauricestucke.com

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