How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

28 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2002

See all articles by Philippe Jehiel

Philippe Jehiel

University College London - Department of Economics; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jacques-François Thisse

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2002

Abstract

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off: Competition among jurisdictions yields higher transfers to the government, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when jurisdictions negotiate prior to the decision-making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous jurisdictions.

Keywords: Jurisdictions, confederation, auction, spillovers, public good

JEL Classification: D44, D62, H41, H70

Suggested Citation

Jehiel, Philippe and Thisse, Jacques-François, How to Win a Decision in a Confederation (July 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3465. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=328320

Philippe Jehiel (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2873 (Phone)
+33 1 4458 2880 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Jacques-François Thisse

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) ( email )

Place des Doyens 1
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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