Nastiness in Groups

81 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2018 Last revised: 23 Jul 2021

See all articles by Michal Bauer

Michal Bauer

Charles University in Prague - Institute of Economic Studies; CERGE-EI

Jana Cahlikova

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Dagmara Celik Katreniak

National Research University Higher School of Economics; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Julie Chytilová

Charles University in Prague - Department of Economics

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague

Tomas Zelinsky

Technical University of Kosice

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 13, 2018

Abstract

This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing financial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions on behalf of a group rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in four large-scale experiments among adolescents, university students and a nationally representative sample of adults (N = 7,426). We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that the “destructiveness shift” in groups is driven by lower perception of individual responsibility, in line with self-signaling models.

Keywords: antisocial behavior, aggressive competitiveness, group membership, group decision-making, group conflict

JEL Classification: C92, C93, D01, D64, D74, D91

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Michal and Cahlikova, Jana and Celik Katreniak, Dagmara and Chytilová, Julie and Cingl, Lubomir and Zelinsky, Tomas, Nastiness in Groups (November 13, 2018). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283686

Michal Bauer

Charles University in Prague - Institute of Economic Studies ( email )

Opletalova 26
Prague 1, 110 00
Czech Republic
+420 222 112 317 (Phone)
+420 222 112 304 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/index.php?module=kernel&action=user&id_user=183&lng=en_GB

CERGE-EI ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

Jana Cahlikova (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.janacahlikova.net

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

Dagmara Celik Katreniak

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hse.ru/en/org/persons/131532236

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/dasacelik/

Julie Chytilová

Charles University in Prague - Department of Economics ( email )

Opletalova 26
Prague 1, 163 00
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/index.php?module=kernel&action=user&id_user=130&lng=cs_CZ

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

Tomas Zelinsky

Technical University of Kosice ( email )

Letna 9
Kosice, 04001
Slovakia

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