Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving

44 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2018 Last revised: 3 Jun 2019

See all articles by Thomas Garcia

Thomas Garcia

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Sébastien Massoni

Queensland University of Technology - Queensland Behavioral Economics Group (QuBE)

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2019

Abstract

A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation -rather than its benefits- are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: ambiguity, excuse-driven behavior, charitable giving, social preferences, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D64, D81

Suggested Citation

Garcia, Thomas and Massoni, Sébastien and Villeval, Marie Claire, Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving (June 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283773 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283773

Thomas Garcia

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Sébastien Massoni

Queensland University of Technology - Queensland Behavioral Economics Group (QuBE) ( email )

2 George Street
GPO Box 2434
Brisbane, 4510
Australia

Marie Claire Villeval (Contact Author)

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
432
PlumX Metrics