Multiperiod Matching

21 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2018

See all articles by Sangram Kadam

Sangram Kadam

Harvard University, Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Students

Maciej H. Kotowski

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: November 2018

Abstract

We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.

Suggested Citation

Kadam, Sangram and Kotowski, Maciej H., Multiperiod Matching (November 2018). International Economic Review, Vol. 59, Issue 4, pp. 1927-1947, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284002 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12324

Sangram Kadam (Contact Author)

Harvard University, Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States

Maciej H. Kotowski

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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