Inside Job: Evidence From the Chinese Housing Market

40 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2018 Last revised: 18 Jun 2019

See all articles by Yongqiang Chu

Yongqiang Chu

Belk College of Business, UNC Charlotte

Weida Kuang

Renmin University of China - School of Business

Daxuan Zhao

Renmin University of China - School of Business

Xiaoxia Zhou

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics-School of Finance

Date Written: June 17, 2019

Abstract

Using a comprehensive dataset of housing transactions in Beijing, China, we find that government officials are more likely than non-officials to buy housing units before government-imposed housing purchase restriction policy. We find that officials use their power to speed up the loan application process and pay higher prices to complete the transactions before the policy. Overall, the results suggest that officials trade on private information they gained during the policy-making process.

Keywords: Government Officials, Insider Trading, Housing Market, Housing Purchase Restriction Policy, China

JEL Classification: G14, O21, R31, R38

Suggested Citation

Chu, Yongqiang and Kuang, weida and Zhao, Daxuan and Zhou, Xiaoxia, Inside Job: Evidence From the Chinese Housing Market (June 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284549 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3284549

Yongqiang Chu (Contact Author)

Belk College of Business, UNC Charlotte ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States
7046877695 (Phone)

Weida Kuang

Renmin University of China - School of Business ( email )

Beijing
China

Daxuan Zhao

Renmin University of China - School of Business ( email )

Beijing
China

HOME PAGE: http://daxuanzhao.weebly.com/

Xiaoxia Zhou

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics-School of Finance ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, AK Shanghai 200433
China

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