Assortative Matching in a Non-Transferable World

19 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2002

See all articles by Patrick Legros

Patrick Legros

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Northeastern University, department of economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2002

Abstract

Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.

Keywords: Assortative matching, principal agent, contract theory

JEL Classification: D51, I22, J41

Suggested Citation

Legros, Patrick and Newman, Andrew F., Assortative Matching in a Non-Transferable World (July 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3469. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=328460

Patrick Legros (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4219/3 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Northeastern University, department of economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-4354 (Phone)
617-353-4143 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
26
Abstract Views
931
PlumX Metrics