Choose Your Battles Wisely: The Consequences of Protesting Government Procurement Contracts

111 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2018 Last revised: 16 Apr 2024

See all articles by Mehmet Canayaz

Mehmet Canayaz

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business

Jess Cornaggia

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Kimberly Cornaggia

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Date Written: April 15, 2024

Abstract

We examine the relation between a firm’s successful protest of a government agency’s conduct or terms of a procurement contract and the amount of business the firm conducts with the government going forward. We find firms receive fewer and less valuable government contracts, face more contract cancellations, and experience significant reductions in sales growth and employee growth. Despite widespread belief, successful bid protesters do not delay government procurement due to lengthy dispute resolutions. Overall, we provide the first analysis of corporate interactions with the United States government bid-protest system.

Keywords: Bid protests, contracting, government contracts

JEL Classification: G38, G30, H57, P16

Suggested Citation

Canayaz, Mehmet and Cornaggia, Jess and Cornaggia, Kimberly, Choose Your Battles Wisely: The Consequences of Protesting Government Procurement Contracts (April 15, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286711 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286711

Mehmet Canayaz (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

Jess Cornaggia

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://directory.smeal.psu.edu/jnc29

Kimberly Cornaggia

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )

306 Business Bldg
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865-2243 (Phone)
814-865-3362 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://directory.smeal.psu.edu/kjr15

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