Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

56 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2018 Last revised: 4 Nov 2019

See all articles by Michael O. Ball

Michael O. Ball

University of Maryland - Decision and Information Technologies Department

Alexander Estes

University of Minnesota - Institute for Mathematics and its Applications

Mark Hansen

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Yulin Liu

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Date Written: November 19, 2018

Abstract

In this paper, we define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Since such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.

Keywords: auction, combinatorial auction, quantity-contingent auction, airport slot allocation

Suggested Citation

Ball, Michael O. and Estes, Alexander and Hansen, Mark and Liu, Yulin, Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots (November 19, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286732

Michael O. Ball

University of Maryland - Decision and Information Technologies Department ( email )

Robert H. Smith School of Business
4313 Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20815
United States
301-405-2227 (Phone)
301-405-8655 (Fax)

Alexander Estes

University of Minnesota - Institute for Mathematics and its Applications ( email )

425 Lind Hall
207 Church St SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://asestes1.github.io

Mark Hansen

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering ( email )

Berkeley, CA
United States

Yulin Liu (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering ( email )

Berkeley, CA
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
43
Abstract Views
387
PlumX Metrics