Civicness Drain

58 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2018 Last revised: 11 Feb 2021

See all articles by Marco Casari

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Maria De Paola

University of Calabria

Andrea Ichino

University of Bologna

Ginevra Marandola

European Commission, Joint Research Centre; University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics; European Commission-Joint Research Centre

Moti Michaeli

University of Haifa; Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality

Vincenzo Scoppa

Università degli Studi della Calabria - Department of Economics and Statistics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2018

Abstract

Migration may cause not only a brain drain but also a "civicness" drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern-Italian high-school students classified as Civic if not cheating in a die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (namely, average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. This pattern is predicted by our model in which Civic and Uncivic types balance hope vs. fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences, and their beliefs about being considered Civic in the place of destination.

Suggested Citation

Casari, Marco and De Paola, Maria and Ichino, Andrea and Marandola, Ginevra and Michaeli, Moti and Scoppa, Vincenzo, Civicness Drain (November 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13311, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3287058

Marco Casari (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Maria De Paola

University of Calabria ( email )

Via Pietro Bucci
Rende CS, Cosenza
Italy

Andrea Ichino

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
+39 349 5965919 (Phone)

Ginevra Marandola

European Commission, Joint Research Centre ( email )

Brussels
Belgium
3287433987 (Phone)

University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

European Commission-Joint Research Centre ( email )

Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Rue du
Brussels, Brussels 1050
Belgium

Moti Michaeli

University of Haifa ( email )

Haifa 31905
Israel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Givat Ram
Jerusalem
Israel

Vincenzo Scoppa

Università degli Studi della Calabria - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

via Ponte Bucci
Arcavacata di Rende, Cosenza 87036
Italy

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