Bank Risk, Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Capacity During a Financial Crisis: A Cross-Country Analysis

28 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2018

See all articles by Rafael F. Schiozer

Rafael F. Schiozer

Fundação Getulio Vargas/EAESP

Frederico Mourad

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil

Ramon Silva Vilarins

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Date Written: November 26, 2018

Abstract

This paper analyzes the competitive effects of government bailout expectations on bank risk using a sample of banks in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries from 2005 to 2015. We verify that, ordinarily, the bailout expectations of a given bank increase its competitors’ risk. During a crisis, however, this effect is mitigated, ie, banks with more protected competitors reduce their risk in relation to banks with less protected competitors. We also show that in countries with higher sovereign risk (a lower capacity to bail out banks), the effect of competitors’ protection on bank risk during a crisis is smaller, which is consistent with the idea that bailing out protected banks becomes less credible in these countries during turbulent times. Taken together, these results suggest that the bailout expectations of competing banks put pressure on bank margins and lead to more risk in normal times, whereas market-disciplining forces become stronger for banks with protected competitors during a crisis, forcing them to reduce risks.

Keywords: bank bailout, bank risk, bank competition, financial crisis, sovereign risk.

Suggested Citation

Schiozer, Rafael F. and Mourad, Frederico and Vilarins, Ramon Silva, Bank Risk, Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Capacity During a Financial Crisis: A Cross-Country Analysis (November 26, 2018). Journal of Credit Risk, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290478

Rafael F. Schiozer (Contact Author)

Fundação Getulio Vargas/EAESP ( email )

Sao Paulo
Brazil
55 11 32817700 (Phone)
55 11 32841789 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fgvsp.br

Frederico Mourad

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil ( email )

P.O. Box 08670
SBS Quadra 3 Bloco B - Edificio-Sede
Brasilia, Distr. Federal 70074-900
Brazil

Ramon Silva Vilarins

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Brasilia
Brazil

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