Competition on Inventory Availability and Price

47 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2018 Last revised: 22 Dec 2019

See all articles by Junfei Lei

Junfei Lei

University of Washington - Department of Information Systems and Operations Management

Yugang Yu

University of Science and Technology of China (USTC)

Fuqiang Zhang

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Renyu (Philip) Zhang

New York University Shanghai

Date Written: December 21, 2019

Abstract

Inventory availability has been widely recognized as an important leverage to enhance the competitive edge of a firm. We study the competition between two retailers who compete on both price and inventory availability. Competition on inventory availability may have important implications on firms' strategies, which has been under-explored in the literature. We develop a game-theoretic framework that integrates the newsvendor and Hotelling models to investigate such competition between retailers. We analyze the strategic interactions among the retailers and customers, and draw the following insights. First, contrary to intuition, the retailers may charge a higher price under competition than in the monopoly setting. A high price signals high product availability, thus facilitating the retailer to attract more customers in the presence of competition. It is well acknowledged that monetary compensation and inventory commitment can mitigate strategic customer behavior and improve a monopoly retailer's profit. In a competitive market, however, both monetary compensation and inventory availability would lead to a prisoner's dilemma. Although these strategies are preferred regardless of the competitor's price and inventory decisions, the equilibrium pro t of each retailer could be lower in the presence of monetary compensation or inventory commitment because either strategy would intensify the competition between retailers. In contrast to the widely held belief that market competition improves customer surplus in general, it may hurt customers in our setting. This is because competition may drive the retailers to charge higher prices to signal inventory availability. We also show that monetary compensation and inventory commitment strategies provide incentives for customers to patronize the retailers, thus mitigating the customer surplus loss caused by competition.

Keywords: Inventory availability, retail competition, strategic customer behavior, newsvendor, Salop circle

Suggested Citation

Lei, Junfei and Yu, Yugang and Zhang, Fuqiang and Zhang, Renyu, Competition on Inventory Availability and Price (December 21, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3292199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3292199

Junfei Lei

University of Washington - Department of Information Systems and Operations Management ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Yugang Yu

University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) ( email )

96, Jinzhai Road
Hefei, Anhui 230026
China

Fuqiang Zhang

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/zhang/

Renyu Zhang (Contact Author)

New York University Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Avenue
Shanghai, 200122
China
86-21-20595135 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nyu.edu/projects/rzhang/index.htm

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