The Applicability to Dispute Settlement of Most Favoured Nation Clauses in International Investment Agreements

(2018) 3(1) Cambridge Law Review 174

19 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2021

See all articles by Alperen Gözlügöl

Alperen Gözlügöl

London School of Economics - Law School

Date Written: November 30, 2018

Abstract

Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses are one of the most conventional clauses generally found in international agreements, particularly in trade and investment agreements. In crude terms, the MFN clause prohibits any discrimination against the investor of the contracting state by according any more favourable treatment to the investors of another state. These clauses, which seem benign at first blush, have led to one of the greatest divergences in investor-state arbitration in respect of their effect on jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. This article asks the central question of whether, by virtue of the MFN clause in the underlying treaty, an investor may benefit from more favourable dispute settlement provisions found in other treaties concluded by the host state. Ultimately, it argues that the application of the MFN clauses with regard to dispute resolution clauses is not feasible.

Keywords: Most Favored Nationed Clauses, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Jurisdiction, Dispute Resolution, International Investment Agreements

Suggested Citation

Gözlügöl, Alperen Afşin, The Applicability to Dispute Settlement of Most Favoured Nation Clauses in International Investment Agreements (November 30, 2018). (2018) 3(1) Cambridge Law Review 174, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293672

Alperen Afşin Gözlügöl (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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