Dynamic Decentralization in Federations: Comparative Conclusions

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Forthcoming

42 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2018

See all articles by Paolo Dardanelli

Paolo Dardanelli

University of Kent

John Kincaid

Lafayette College

Alan Fenna

Curtin University

André Kaiser

University of Cologne

Andre Lecours

University of Ottawa

Ajay Kumar Singh

Jamia Hamdard (Hamdard University)

Sean Mueller

University of Berne

Stephan Vogel

University of Cologne

Date Written: November 28, 2018

Abstract

This article presents the conclusions of the project Why Centralization and Decentralization in Federations?, which analyzed dynamic decentralization in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and the United States over their entire life span. It highlights six main conclusions. First, dynamic decentralization is complex and multidimensional; it cannot be captured by fiscal data alone. Second, while centralization was the dominant trend, Canada is an exception. Third, contrary to some expectations, centralization occurred mainly in the legislative, rather than fiscal, sphere. Fourth, centralization is not only a mid-twentieth century phenomenon; considerable change occurred both before and after. Fifth, variation in centralization across federations appears to be driven by conjunctural causation rather than the net effect of any individual factor. Sixth, institutional properties influence the instruments of dynamic decentralization but do not significantly affect its direction or magnitude. These findings have important conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and empirical implications for the study of federalism.

Keywords: federalism, centralization, decentralization, fiscal federalism

JEL Classification: H11, H20, H5, H7

Suggested Citation

Dardanelli, Paolo and Kincaid, John and Fenna, Alan and Kaiser, André and Lecours, Andre and Singh, Ajay Kumar and Mueller, Sean and Vogel, Stephan, Dynamic Decentralization in Federations: Comparative Conclusions (November 28, 2018). Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3294237

Paolo Dardanelli (Contact Author)

University of Kent ( email )

University of Kent
Canterbury, CT2 7NX
United Kingdom
441227827417 (Phone)
441227827033 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://dardanelli.net

John Kincaid

Lafayette College ( email )

Easton, PA 18042
United States

Alan Fenna

Curtin University ( email )

Kent Street
Bentley
Perth, WA WA 6102
Australia

André Kaiser

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.politik.uni-koeln.de/kaiser/

Andre Lecours

University of Ottawa ( email )

2292 Edwin Crescent
Ottawa, Ontario K2C 1H7
Canada

Ajay Kumar Singh

Jamia Hamdard (Hamdard University) ( email )

Hamdard Nagar
New Delhi, 110062
India

Sean Mueller

University of Berne ( email )

Bern
Switzerland

Stephan Vogel

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

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