Mechanism Design for Grid Computing

21 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2018

See all articles by Zoltan Hidvegi

Zoltan Hidvegi

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hong Xu

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Jianqing Chen

The University of Texas at Dallas, Jindal School of Management

Andrew B. Whinston

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management

Date Written: August 26, 2009

Abstract

We develop a system for grid computing where the price of computing tasks is determined by an audited market-exchange. We show a method to provide a variable certificate, called \witness," of program execution with the following property: If two different agents running the same program on the same input produce the same witness, that proves with certainty very close to 1 that both agents have executed the program correctly. Using these witnesses, a trusted intermediary audits grid agents by dispatching identical work units to different agents and comparing their results. The results of past audits create a reputation history for agents, which is used to offer different prices to consumers based on the expected reliability corresponding to a reputation history. We allow reputations to be traded, instead of being tied to individual agents, and we show that in such a reputation market only high-type agents would have incentive to purchase a high reputation, and only low-type agents would use low reputations.

Keywords: Grid Computing, Reputation, Reputation Market, Trust, Game Theory

JEL Classification: D40, D86, M20, M42

Suggested Citation

Hidvegi, Zoltan and Xu, Hong and Chen, Jianqing and Whinston, Andrew B., Mechanism Design for Grid Computing (August 26, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295128 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3295128

Zoltan Hidvegi

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hong Xu

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

999999

Jianqing Chen

The University of Texas at Dallas, Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 West Campbell Road
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

Andrew B. Whinston (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management ( email )

CBA 5.202
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-8879 (Phone)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
12
Abstract Views
180
PlumX Metrics