The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance

7 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2018 Last revised: 6 Dec 2018

See all articles by Murat C. Mungan

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: December 3, 2018

Abstract

Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also reduces the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.

Keywords: Standard of proof, avoidance, audit, deterrence, evidence, judicial error.

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K42.

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C., The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance (December 3, 2018). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295365

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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