Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting a Laboratory Experiment Using Alternative Proportional Systems

WP 1833 – December 2018

22 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2018

See all articles by Isabelle Lebon

Isabelle Lebon

Université de Caen

Antoinette Baujard

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Frédéric Gavrel

Université de Caen

Herrade Igersheim

University of Strasbourg

Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Date Written: October 20, 2017

Abstract

In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules: the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity.

Keywords: Approval Voting, Cumulative Voting, Proportional Systems, Contextualized Experiment, Laboratory Experiment, Strategic Voting

JEL Classification: D72, C93

Suggested Citation

Lebon, Isabelle and Baujard, Antoinette and Gavrel, Frédéric and Igersheim, Herrade and Laslier, Jean Francois, Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting a Laboratory Experiment Using Alternative Proportional Systems (October 20, 2017). WP 1833 – December 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295592

Isabelle Lebon (Contact Author)

Université de Caen ( email )

F-14032 Caen Cedex
France

Antoinette Baujard

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93 chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Frédéric Gavrel

Université de Caen ( email )

F-14032 Caen Cedex, Normandy
France

Herrade Igersheim

University of Strasbourg ( email )

61, avenue de la foret noire
Strasbourg, Alsace 3000
France

Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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