45 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2018

See all articles by Shay Lavie

Shay Lavie

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 5, 2018


The Article addresses simple yet surprisingly overlooked questions — could numerical caps on legal rights be a valuable regulatory mechanism? In which circumstances should we employ them? It is the first to discuss numerical caps — quotas — as a distinct regulatory instrument, and the lessons it provides are pertinent to numerous legal settings.

The Article first sets out the theoretical framework for using quotas. It does so by synthesizing real-world examples and fleshing out the reasons for choosing quotas, especially non-tradable, over other regulatory alternatives, such as prices. Armed with the theoretical insights, the Article then suggests practical implications. In particular, capping the right to access courts through quotas can be valuable in balancing some of the conflicts that the American legal system faces. Such quotas restrict overuse of courts and push litigants to carefully invoke their rights, and they simultaneously guarantee a wide access to courts without imposing fees. Accordingly, the Article analyzes several litigation contexts — such as interlocutory appeals and pleading standards — in which policymakers can benefit from quotas.

Keywords: price mechanisms, non-tradable caps, externalities, access to justice, pleading standards, regulatory alternatives, willingness to pay, commodification

JEL Classification: K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Lavie, Shay, Quotas (December 5, 2018). Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 34, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3296219

Shay Lavie (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
972-3-6409146 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Eng/?CategoryID=242&ArticleID=548

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics