Can Food-for-Work Programs Reduce Vulnerability?

Insurance Against Poverty, Stefan Dercon, ed., Forthcoming

Posted: 4 Apr 2003

See all articles by Christopher B. Barrett

Christopher B. Barrett

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management

Stein T. Holden

Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Daniel C. Clay

Michigan State University - Institute of International Agriculture

Abstract

Food-for-work (FFW) programs are widely touted for their capacity to target poor populations effectively with a reliable safety net, thereby reducing vulnerability due to downside risk exposure, while simultaneously investing in the production or maintenance of valuable public goods necessary to stimulate productivity and thus growth in aggregate incomes. The empirical evidence is mixed, however, as to the efficacy of FFW in any of these dimensions. Proponents cite cases in which FFW appears to have performed as intended, while opponents present evidence of its failures. The development community needs to guard against uncritical acceptance of either naive or hostile claims about FFW and to develop a better understanding of how, when and why FFW programs can indeed reduce vulnerability. This chapter aims to advance such an understanding.

Keywords: Famine, food aid, poverty, public employment programs, transfers

JEL Classification: O12, Q18, O15, O20, I3

Suggested Citation

Barrett, Christopher B. and Holden, Stein T. and Clay, Daniel C., Can Food-for-Work Programs Reduce Vulnerability?. Insurance Against Poverty, Stefan Dercon, ed., Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=329660

Christopher B. Barrett (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management ( email )

315 Warren Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801
United States
607-255-4489 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/

Stein T. Holden

Norwegian University of Life Sciences ( email )

PO Box 5033
NO-1432 Aas
Norway
+47-64965699 (Phone)
+47-64943012 (Fax)

Daniel C. Clay

Michigan State University - Institute of International Agriculture ( email )

324 Agriculture Hall
Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-0174 (Phone)

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