What Matters for Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders? Survey and Experimental Evidence

35 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2018

See all articles by Armenak Antinyan

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Filippo Pavesi

Università Carlo Cattaneo (LIUC) - Institute of Economics; Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business

Date Written: December 9, 2018

Abstract

Whistleblowing is a powerful tool that the tax authorities of various countries use to curb tax evasion. Nonetheless, the determinants shaping one’s positive attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders are rather understudied. We investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. We use data from two survey experiments conducted in Italy and the US, as well as from a unique national household survey administered in the Republic of Armenia. Our findings indicate that the level of trust in the government positively influences individuals’ attitude toward whistleblowing, with this effect being robust across countries and data sources.

Keywords: Government Trust, Whistleblowing, Tax Evasion.

JEL Classification: H26, G28

Suggested Citation

Antinyan, Armenak and Corazzini, Luca and Pavesi, Filippo, What Matters for Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders? Survey and Experimental Evidence (December 9, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3298381

Armenak Antinyan (Contact Author)

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Aberconway Building
Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Filippo Pavesi

Università Carlo Cattaneo (LIUC) - Institute of Economics ( email )

21053 Castellanza (VA)
Italy

Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business ( email )

Hoboken, NJ 07030
United States

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