Introduction to Special Issue: The Appropriate Role of Government in U.S. Mortgage Markets

10 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2018

See all articles by W. Scott Frame

W. Scott Frame

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Joseph S. Tracy

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Date Written: December 2018

Abstract

The U.S. mortgage finance system was one of the focal points of the 2007-08 financial crisis, yet legislative decisions about the appropriate role of the federal government in the system remain unsettled. Policy deliberations have focused on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—the two enormous government-sponsored enterprises that were placed into federal conservatorship in September 2008. The two GSEs have long been the centerpieces of a mortgage finance system that relies on capital market financing of U.S. residential mortgages. This volume contains eight articles that touch on several key components of housing finance reform. We hope that the insights offered here will assist legislative efforts aimed at promoting a more efficient, equitable, and financially sound mortgage system in the future.

Keywords: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, housing finance, mortgages, financial crisis, government intervention

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G22, G28, H12

Suggested Citation

Frame, W. Scott and Tracy, Joseph, Introduction to Special Issue: The Appropriate Role of Government in U.S. Mortgage Markets (December 2018). Economic Policy Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299004

W. Scott Frame (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

2200 N Pearl Street
Dallas, TX 75201
United States
214-922-6984 (Phone)

Joseph Tracy

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

2200 North Pearl Street
PO Box 655906
Dallas, TX 75265-5906
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
45
Abstract Views
368
PlumX Metrics