Financial Gains from Legislative Office: Evidence from Brazilian Municipal Councilors

48 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2018 Last revised: 20 Feb 2019

Date Written: February 16, 2019

Abstract

I study how much Brazilian local legislators benefit financially from holding public office. Employing a Regression Discontinuity strategy, I find that the annual asset growth of elected candidates is 10.2 percentage points higher than that of the unelected. The higher relative asset growth of elected politicians is found to be positively associated with public office wages, but not with rent-seeking. These results suggest the existence of large legal financial benefits from legislative office with unclear implications to social welfare.

Keywords: Rent-seeking, Corruption, Public Office Wages, Brazil

JEL Classification: D72, D73, K42

Suggested Citation

Cunha, Gabriel, Financial Gains from Legislative Office: Evidence from Brazilian Municipal Councilors (February 16, 2019). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299680 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299680

Gabriel Cunha (Contact Author)

Duke University ( email )

Durham, NC
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.duke.edu/gabrielcunha/

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