Board Antecedents of CEO Duality and the Moderating Role of Country‐Level Managerial Discretion: A Meta‐Analytic Investigation

31 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2018

See all articles by Gang Wang

Gang Wang

Florida State University - Department of Management

Kaitlyn DeGhetto

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

B. Parker Ellen

Northeastern University

Bruce Lamont

Florida State University - Department of Management

Date Written: January 2019

Abstract

CEO duality reduces boards’ monitoring capacity. But governance substitution theory holds that boards of directors who can effectively monitor their CEOs are more likely to adopt the CEO duality governance structure. By examining relationships between board characteristics underlying their monitoring capacity and CEO duality, we bring evidence to bear on governance substitution theory. Further, by applying a managerial discretion theory lens to CEO duality, we extend governance substitution theory to the cross‐country context where institutional features vary in their constraints on managerial discretion. Meta‐analytic results from a dataset of 297 studies across 32 countries/regions provided support for the majority of our predictions. As predicted, board independence and certain types of board human capital were positively related to CEO duality. Unexpectedly, board ownership was negatively related to CEO duality. Additionally, country‐level managerial discretion significantly moderated the board independence‐ and human capital‐duality relationships (but not the board‐ownership‐duality relationship) as predicted.

Keywords: board monitoring, CEO duality, governance substitution, managerial discretion, meta‐analysis

Suggested Citation

Wang, Gang and DeGhetto, Kaitlyn and Ellen, B. Parker and Lamont, Bruce, Board Antecedents of CEO Duality and the Moderating Role of Country‐Level Managerial Discretion: A Meta‐Analytic Investigation (January 2019). Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 56, Issue 1, pp. 172-202, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300992 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joms.12408

Gang Wang (Contact Author)

Florida State University - Department of Management ( email )

United States

Kaitlyn DeGhetto

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs ( email )

1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway
Colorado Springs, CO 80918-7150
United States

B. Parker Ellen

Northeastern University ( email )

220 B RP
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Bruce Lamont

Florida State University - Department of Management ( email )

United States

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