Anti-Social Behavior in Groups

53 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2018

See all articles by Michal Bauer

Michal Bauer

Charles University in Prague - Institute of Economic Studies; CERGE-EI

Jana Cahlikova

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Dagmara Celik Katreniak

National Research University Higher School of Economics; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Julie Chytilová

Charles University in Prague - Department of Economics

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague

Tomáš Želinský

Charles University in Prague

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Abstract

This paper provides strong evidence supporting the long-standing speculation that decision-making in groups has a dark side, by magnifying the prevalence of anti-social behavior towards outsiders. A large-scale experiment implemented in Slovakia and Uganda (N=2,309) reveals that deciding in a group with randomly assigned peers increases the prevalence of anti-social behavior that reduces everyone's payoff but which improves the relative position of own group. The effects are driven by the influence of a group context on individual behavior, rather than by group deliberation. The observed patterns are strikingly similar on both continents.

Keywords: group decision-making, antisocial behavior, aggressive competitiveness, group membership, group conflict

JEL Classification: C92, C93, D01, D64, D74, D91

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Michal and Cahlikova, Jana and Celik Katreniak, Dagmara and Chytilová, Julie and Cingl, Lubomir and Želinský, Tomáš, Anti-Social Behavior in Groups. IZA Discussion Paper No. 11944, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301695

Michal Bauer (Contact Author)

Charles University in Prague - Institute of Economic Studies ( email )

Opletalova 26
Prague 1, 110 00
Czech Republic
+420 222 112 317 (Phone)
+420 222 112 304 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/index.php?module=kernel&action=user&id_user=183&lng=en_GB

CERGE-EI ( email )

P.O. Box 882
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Prague 1, 111 21
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Jana Cahlikova

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.janacahlikova.net

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

Dagmara Celik Katreniak

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hse.ru/en/org/persons/131532236

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/dasacelik/

Julie Chytilová

Charles University in Prague - Department of Economics ( email )

Opletalova 26
Prague 1, 163 00
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/index.php?module=kernel&action=user&id_user=130&lng=cs_CZ

Lubomir Cingl

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

Tomáš Želinský

Charles University in Prague ( email )

Celetná 13
Praha 1, 116 36
Czech Republic

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