Gender-Targeted Job Ads in the Recruitment Process: Evidence from China

49 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2018

See all articles by Peter Kuhn

Peter Kuhn

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kailing Shen

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics

Shuo Zhang

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2018

Abstract

We document how explicit employer requests for applicants of a particular gender enter the recruitment process on a Chinese job board. We find that 95 percent of callbacks to gendered jobs are of the requested gender; worker self-selection (“compliance” with employers’ requests) and employer callback decisions from applicant pools (“enforcement”) both contribute to this association, with compliance playing the larger role. Explicit gender requests account for over half of the gender segregation and gender wage gap observed on the board. Ad-level regressions with job title and firm fixed effects suggest that employers’ explicit gender requests have causal effects on the gender mix of applications received, especially when the employer’s likely gender preference is hard to infer from other contents of the ad. Application-level regressions with job title and worker fixed effects show that both men and women experience a callback penalty when applying to a gender-mismatched job; this penalty is significantly greater for women (44 percent) than men (26 percent).

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Suggested Citation

Kuhn, Peter J. and Shen, Kailing and Zhang, Shuo, Gender-Targeted Job Ads in the Recruitment Process: Evidence from China (December 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w25365. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302489

Peter J. Kuhn (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Kailing Shen

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://grad.econ.ubc.ca/kailings/index.html

Shuo Zhang

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) ( email )

Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

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