Comment on 'Error and Regulatory Risk in Financial Institution Regulation'

7 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2019 Last revised: 10 Jan 2019

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2018

Abstract

I agree with just about everything Jonathan Macey (2017) says in his symposium contribution. His claim that bureaucratic tendencies toward regularity—specifically, treating like cases alike—generate errors in categorization seems appropriate to me. His explanations of the pathologies in financial regulation should fall in the category of essential or required reading for anyone who chooses to write on the topic. Where I differ from Macey is in the choice of framework, or perspective from which to view the pathologies. Whereas Macey adopts an “error cost” framework, which is clearly appropriate for this symposium, I would build explicitly on a “public choice” framework.

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Comment on 'Error and Regulatory Risk in Financial Institution Regulation' (December 1, 2018). Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302683 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302683

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
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617-353-3077 (Fax)

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