Reforming Withdrawal and Opt-Outs from the European Union: A Dual-Constituent Perspective

DCU Brexit Institute - Working Paper N.11 - 2018

32 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2019

See all articles by Oliver Garner

Oliver Garner

Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law

Date Written: December 19, 2018

Abstract

This paper engages in a normative critique of the phenomena of Member State withdrawal and opt-outs from the European Union from the perspective of the dual-constituent thesis. Opt-outs from the EU legal order are conceptualised as the retention of the constituent power of Member States to derogate from the norms of the EU constitutional order. By contrast, Article 50 TEU functions as the pooling of the ultimate sovereign authority for nationals of a a Member State to withdraw their consent to engage in the exercise of constituent power at the European level. It is argued that reform should be enacted to limit the power to opt-out to strict conditions established by the EU constitutional order. By contrast, although withdrawal may have more extensive consequences for individuals, the sovereign right to withdraw is a prerequisite for the exercise of the mixed constituent power shared by individuals in their dual roles as nationals of the Member State and citizens of the EU. Therefore, reform of withdrawal could only legitimately be enacted at the domestic level of the 'constitutional requirements' necessary under Article 50(1) TEU.

Suggested Citation

Garner, Oliver, Reforming Withdrawal and Opt-Outs from the European Union: A Dual-Constituent Perspective (December 19, 2018). DCU Brexit Institute - Working Paper N.11 - 2018 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3303938

Oliver Garner (Contact Author)

Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law ( email )

Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London WC1B 5JP
United Kingdom

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