Cost-Raising Strategies in a Symmetric, Dynamic Duopoly

19 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2003

See all articles by Robin A. Mason

Robin A. Mason

University of Southampton - Division of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning-by-doing.

Suggested Citation

Mason, Robin, Cost-Raising Strategies in a Symmetric, Dynamic Duopoly. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 317-335, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=330409

Robin Mason (Contact Author)

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3268 (Phone)
+44 23 8059 3858 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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