Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 169, pp. 38-52, January 2020

28 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2019 Last revised: 17 Jan 2020

See all articles by Bouke Klein Teeselink

Bouke Klein Teeselink

VU Amsterdam - School of Business and Economics

Rogier Jan Dave Potter van Loon

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Martijn J. van den Assem

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Dennie van Dolder

VU Amsterdam - School of Business and Economics; Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) - University of Nottingham

Date Written: November 19, 2019

Abstract

This paper examines how within-match variation in incentives affects the performance of darts players. The game of darts offers an attractive naturally occurring research setting, because performance can be observed at the individual level and without obscuring effects of risk considerations and behavior of others. We analyze four data sets covering a total of 29,381 darts matches of professional, amateur, and youth players. We find that amateur and youth players display a sizable performance decrease at decisive moments. Professional players appear less susceptible of such choking under pressure. Our results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance.

Keywords: incentives, performance pressure, choking under pressure, darts

JEL Classification: D01, D91, Z20

Suggested Citation

Klein Teeselink, Bouke and Potter van Loon, Rogier Jan Dave and van den Assem, Martijn J. and van Dolder, Dennie, Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts (November 19, 2019). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 169, pp. 38-52, January 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304092 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304092

Bouke Klein Teeselink (Contact Author)

VU Amsterdam - School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081 HV
Netherlands

Rogier Jan Dave Potter van Loon

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Martijn J. Van den Assem

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Dennie Van Dolder

VU Amsterdam - School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) - University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

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