Models of Cartel Collusion in the Framework of Public Procurement

Posted: 9 Mar 2021

See all articles by Natalia Mamedova

Natalia Mamedova

Plekhanov Russian University of Economics

Date Written: August 20, 2018

Abstract

The study presents an analysis of the dynamics of the conclusion of anticompetitive agreements, as well as a meaningful analysis of the specifics of cartel collusions implemented within the state and municipal orders in the Russian Federation. The main features of cartel collusion at the auction are highlighted. The analysis of the practice of state and municipal purchases carried out by the authors will allow to identify and reveal models of interaction of participants in cartel collusion at tenders and ways of manipulating the prices of concluded contracts. The paper specifies the need to develop methods for preliminary and ongoing monitoring of the formation and maintenance of cartel collusion within the framework of state and municipal purchases.

Keywords: model, cartel, collusion, public procurement, manipulation, price, contract

Suggested Citation

Mamedova, Natalia, Models of Cartel Collusion in the Framework of Public Procurement (August 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304443

Natalia Mamedova (Contact Author)

Plekhanov Russian University of Economics ( email )

Stremyanny lane, 36
Moscow, 117997
Russia

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