Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections

61 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2019

See all articles by Mehmet Ekmekci

Mehmet Ekmekci

Boston College - Department of Economics

Stephan Lauermann

University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 11, 2018

Abstract

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, then elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any responsive and symmetric equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small. We provide conditions under which the additional equilibria are stable. We show that the Condorcet jury theorem also fails if abstention is allowed or if there is aggregate uncertainty due to the presence of noise voters. The presence of noise voters simplifies the analysis.

Keywords: Voting, Poisson Games

JEL Classification: D83

Suggested Citation

Ekmekci, Mehmet and Lauermann, Stephan, Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections (December 11, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3305037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305037

Mehmet Ekmekci (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

United States

Stephan Lauermann

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Bonn
Germany

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