Kidneys Without Money

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE; DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0003

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-2

Posted: 7 Jan 2019

Date Written: November 27, 2018

Abstract

Market design and matching have been especially important for markets in which the use of money is viewed as repugnant or distasteful. This article employs the example of kidney exchange, with a particular focus on a new form, global kidney exchange (GKE), to highlight the manner by which repugnance and the law limit exchange and create scarcity. Yet it also opens the door to innovation that, at each stage of market development, prompts new repugnance concerns and initiates a renegotiation of legal rules, social norms, and institutional barriers.

Keywords: kidney exchange, taboo trades, repugnance, matching markets

JEL Classification: K0

Suggested Citation

Krawiec, Kimberly D., Kidneys Without Money (November 27, 2018). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE; DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0003; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3305730

Kimberly D. Krawiec (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
141
PlumX Metrics