Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms

Forthcoming in Media Markets and Competition Law, Antonio Bavasso, David S. Evans, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, eds., Competition Policy International (2019)

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-50

16 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2019 Last revised: 9 Jan 2019

See all articles by Joshua D. Wright

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: December 31, 2018

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express settled a number of critical issues concerning multisided platforms—including whether each side of a platform constitutes a separate relevant product market. The ruling also addressed whether a prima facie assessment of competitive harm must incorporate the impact to consumers on all sides of a platform. The Court, however, potentially narrowed the scope of its ruling by making an explicit distinction between “transaction” and “non-transaction” platforms. We examine whether this is a meaningful distinction and explain how the Court’s logic applies to non-transaction platforms.

Keywords: platforms, multi-sided markets, two-sided markets, complements, antitrust, credit cards, payment cards, rule of reason, Supreme Court, burden shifting

JEL Classification: K21, K41, L40

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D. and Yun, John M., Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms (December 31, 2018). Forthcoming in Media Markets and Competition Law, Antonio Bavasso, David S. Evans, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, eds., Competition Policy International (2019); George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-50. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308516

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

John M. Yun (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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