Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms
Forthcoming in Media Markets and Competition Law, Antonio Bavasso, David S. Evans, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, eds., Competition Policy International (2019)
16 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2019 Last revised: 9 Jan 2019
Date Written: December 31, 2018
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express settled a number of critical issues concerning multisided platforms—including whether each side of a platform constitutes a separate relevant product market. The ruling also addressed whether a prima facie assessment of competitive harm must incorporate the impact to consumers on all sides of a platform. The Court, however, potentially narrowed the scope of its ruling by making an explicit distinction between “transaction” and “non-transaction” platforms. We examine whether this is a meaningful distinction and explain how the Court’s logic applies to non-transaction platforms.
Keywords: platforms, multi-sided markets, two-sided markets, complements, antitrust, credit cards, payment cards, rule of reason, Supreme Court, burden shifting
JEL Classification: K21, K41, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation