Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2019

Forthcoming in Media Markets and Competition Law, Antonio Bavasso, David S. Evans, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, eds., Competition Policy International (2019)

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-50

9 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2019 Last revised: 11 Jul 2019

See all articles by Joshua D. Wright

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Date Written: December 31, 2018

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express settled a number of critical issues concerning multisided platforms—including whether each side of a platform constitutes a separate relevant product market. The ruling also addressed whether a prima facie assessment of competitive harm must incorporate the impact to consumers on all sides of a platform. The Court, however, potentially narrowed the scope of its ruling by making an explicit distinction between “transaction” and “non-transaction” platforms. We examine whether this is a meaningful distinction and explain how the Court’s logic applies to non-transaction platforms.

Keywords: platforms, multi-sided markets, two-sided markets, complements, antitrust, credit cards, payment cards, rule of reason, Supreme Court, burden shifting

JEL Classification: K21, K41, L40

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D. and Yun, John M., Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms (December 31, 2018). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2019, Forthcoming in Media Markets and Competition Law, Antonio Bavasso, David S. Evans, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, eds., Competition Policy International (2019), George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-50, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308516

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Mclean, VA 22101
United States

John M. Yun (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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