Law and Moral Justification

18 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2019

Date Written: December 31, 2018

Abstract

Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law-applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions — that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims.

Keywords: law, moral justification, authority

Suggested Citation

Faggion, Andrea, Law and Moral Justification (December 31, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308528 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308528

Andrea Faggion (Contact Author)

State University of Londrina ( email )

Londrina Parana, 87051-270
Brazil

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
29
Abstract Views
118
PlumX Metrics