Using Visual Salience in Empirical Game Theory

59 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2019

See all articles by Xiaomin Li

Xiaomin Li

California Institute of Technology

Colin Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Date Written: January 1, 2019

Abstract

Coordination games often have salient “focal points”. In games where choices are locations in images, we test for the effect of salience, predicted a priori using a neuroscience-based algorithm, Concentration of salience is correlated with the rate of matching when players are trying to match (r=.64). In hider-seeker games, all players choose salient locations more often, creating a “seeker’s advantage” (seekers win 9% of games). Salience-choice relations are explained by a salience-enhanced cognitive hierarchy model. The novel prediction that time pressure will increases seeker’s advantage, by biasing choices toward salience, is confirmed. Other links to salience in economics are suggested.

Keywords: salience, focal points, coordination, neuroeconomic

JEL Classification: C72, C92

Suggested Citation

Li, Xiaomin and Camerer, Colin F., Using Visual Salience in Empirical Game Theory (January 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308886 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308886

Xiaomin Li

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Colin F. Camerer (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4054 (Phone)
626-432-1726 (Fax)

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