Enhancing Transparency and Issuing Special Passes: The Spurious Diffusion of Lobbyist Registers

45 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2019

See all articles by Fabrizio De Francesco

Fabrizio De Francesco

University of Strathclyde

Philipp Trein

University of Geneva - Department of Political Science and International Relations; University of Lausanne, IEPHI

Date Written: January 2, 2019

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on interest group politics by analysing the adoption of lobbyist registers among 40 member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union. After a long period of rare adoption, 12 countries have decided to enhance transparency by regulating access to policymaking. Statistical results and case studies demonstrate that the presence of high levels of corruption and the structure of the civil society are significant functional explanations for the regulation of lobbying activities. At the onset of the spread of adoption of such regulation and in spite of international organizations' advocacy, there is no evidence for any mechanism of countries' interdependence, indicating spurious diffusion.

Keywords: corruption, interest groups, civil society, lobby register, transparency

JEL Classification: L30, Z18

Suggested Citation

De Francesco, Fabrizio and Trein, Philipp, Enhancing Transparency and Issuing Special Passes: The Spurious Diffusion of Lobbyist Registers (January 2, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3309047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3309047

Fabrizio De Francesco

University of Strathclyde ( email )

16 Richmond Street
Glasgow 1XQ, Scotland G1 1XQ
United Kingdom

Philipp Trein (Contact Author)

University of Geneva - Department of Political Science and International Relations ( email )

40 boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Genève 4, CH-1211
Switzerland

University of Lausanne, IEPHI ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

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