Illegal Immigration, Unemployment, and Multiple Destinations

27 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2019

See all articles by Kaz Miyagiwa

Kaz Miyagiwa

Emory University - Department of Economics; Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER); Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics

Yasuhiro Sato

University of Tokyo

Date Written: January 2019

Abstract

We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.

Keywords: equilibrium unemployment, illegal immigration, immigration policy competition, job search, multiple destinations

Suggested Citation

Miyagiwa, Kaz and Sato, Yasuhiro, Illegal Immigration, Unemployment, and Multiple Destinations (January 2019). Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 118-144, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jors.12408

Kaz Miyagiwa (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Miami, FL 33199
United States

Yasuhiro Sato

University of Tokyo ( email )

Yayoi 1-1-1
Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo 113-8657
Japan

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
46
PlumX Metrics