A Maximalist Approach to Data from India’s New Insolvency and Bankruptcy System

43 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2019

See all articles by Adam Feibelman

Adam Feibelman

Tulane University - Law School

Renuka Sane

Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation; National Institute of Public Finance and Policy

Date Written: December 28, 2018


The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has a statutory responsibility to gather and disseminate information about India’s new insolvency and bankruptcy system. That system is still in its infancy, and the Board has a unique opportunity to design a comprehensive approach to generating, gathering, and disseminating data. Empirical research on bankruptcy in the U.S. illustrates that data are essential for assessing how insolvency and bankruptcy systems function, how they affect various stakeholders, and what economic and social impact they are having. Data generated by insolvency and bankruptcy systems can also be a uniquely valuable source of information about the broader economy and society, including macro-economic vulnerabilities and failures plaguing certain financial products.

This chapter proposes that the Board and the adjudicating tribunals under the India's new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code adopt a maximalist approach to data, limited only by institutional capacity and basic privacy norms. It describes types of data that the new insolvency and bankruptcy system can generate, challenges in gathering and disseminating it, and the comparative advantages that the Board and the tribunals have in doing so. This chapter also proposes that the Board conduct a pilot or diagnostic study of the data currently being generated by the system to determine its reliability, consistency, and usability for both internal assessment and external research.

Keywords: insolvency, bankruptcy, data, India

Suggested Citation

Feibelman, Adam and Sane, Renuka, A Maximalist Approach to Data from India’s New Insolvency and Bankruptcy System (December 28, 2018). Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 19-4, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3311195

Adam Feibelman (Contact Author)

Tulane University - Law School ( email )

6329 Freret Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Renuka Sane

Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation ( email )

New Delhi

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy ( email )

18/2, Satsang Vihar Marg
New Delhi, 110067

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