Changing the Rules: Political Competition Under Plurality and Proportionality

Posted: 23 Oct 2002

See all articles by Ram Mudambi

Ram Mudambi

Temple University - Department of Strategic Management

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS

Giuseppe Sobbrio

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance

Abstract

From the wide range of voting schemes, two electoral rules, proportional representation (PR) and plurality (PL) attract primary interest. This paper examines the relationship between proportionality, voter information and a conception of the power of competing political parties under the differing electoral rules. Data are from three Sicilian provincial elections (1985, 1990 and 1994). Two measures of power and two measures of proportionality are used and Olson's theory of groups is applied to derive a measure of voter information. The results indicate that proportionality and voter information have a negative effect on political party power dilution under PR rules. However, these effects disappear under PL rules. We offer some interpretations of these findings.

Keywords: Plurality, proportionality, political competition

JEL Classification: D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Mudambi, Ram and Navarra, Pietro and Sobbrio, Giuseppe, Changing the Rules: Political Competition Under Plurality and Proportionality. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=331182

Ram Mudambi (Contact Author)

Temple University - Department of Strategic Management ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-2099 (Phone)
215-204-8029 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sbm.temple.edu/~rmudambi/index.html

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina
Sicilia, 98122
Italy
39-090-676-4446 (Phone)
39-090-292-0014 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44-207-955-6820 (Phone)

Giuseppe Sobbrio

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina
Sicilia, 98122
Italy

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
712
PlumX Metrics