Managing the German Debt

Emanuel Castellarin & Andrea Hamann (eds), Le traité de Versailles : Regards ds en droit international à l’occasion du centenaire / The Versailles Treaty: French and German Perspectives in International Law on the Occasion of the Centenary, Paris: Pedone 2020, pp. 253–265

15 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last revised: 14 Oct 2020

See all articles by Thomas Kleinlein

Thomas Kleinlein

Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Date Written: December 16, 2018

Abstract

This chapter analyses the essential provisions of the Versailles reparations scheme and argues that this scheme, with its concept of reparations and with other features, was unprecedented in the history of peace treaties. The chronology of the management of the German debt – a story of treaty execution and treaty revision from 1920 to 2010 – can be divided into various reparation schemes, most significantly those of the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan. However, the degree to which already the Paris Conference set the basic patterns for this entire history of reparations is striking. Its themes, schemes and devices appeared again and again in one guise or another. The chapter concludes on what these recurrent themes can mean for the legal framework of sovereign debt management beyond the singular experience of the Versailles Treaty.

Keywords: Versailles Treaty, reparations, Dawes Plan, Young Plan

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Kleinlein, Thomas, Managing the German Debt (December 16, 2018). Emanuel Castellarin & Andrea Hamann (eds), Le traité de Versailles : Regards ds en droit international à l’occasion du centenaire / The Versailles Treaty: French and German Perspectives in International Law on the Occasion of the Centenary, Paris: Pedone 2020, pp. 253–265, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312314

Thomas Kleinlein (Contact Author)

Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena ( email )

Faculty of Law
Carl-Zeiss-Straße 3
Jena, Thuringia 07743
Germany
+49(0)3641-942201 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rewi.uni-jena.de/en/Kleinlein

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