Green Technology Diffusion: A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons

32 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2019 Last revised: 2 Feb 2019

See all articles by Jorge L. Contreras

Jorge L. Contreras

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law

Bronwyn H. Hall

University of California at Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 10, 2018

Abstract

We revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016, using both participant survey and data analytic evidence. Established in January 2008 by several large multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248 patents covering 94 “green” inventions. Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable environmentally friendly technologies. Our updated results now show that the commons did not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from several structural and organizational issues. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of patent commons in enabling the diffusion of patented technologies more broadly.

Keywords: patent commons, patent pledge, green technology, eco-patent, diffusion, climate change

JEL Classification: Q55, O34, O13

Suggested Citation

Contreras, Jorge L. and Hall, Bronwyn H. and Helmers, Christian, Green Technology Diffusion: A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons (December 10, 2018). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-02; University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 297. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3313407

Jorge L. Contreras

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )

383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

Bronwyn H. Hall (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/index.html

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Department of Economics ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

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