Building Judicial Authority: A Comparison Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court

19 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2019

See all articles by Armin von Bogdandy

Armin von Bogdandy

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

Davide Paris

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

Date Written: January 10, 2019

Abstract

This paper examines the foundations of the Italian Constitutional Court’s authority by comparing it with that of the German Federal Constitutional Court. In comparison to the German Court, la Corte had to build its authority on a particularly weak legal basis. However, it succeeded in developing a dynamic of “power in weakness” which explains important features of the Italian Constitutional Court: its exceptionally cooperative relationship with the ordinary courts, its terse style of reasoning, its deliberate low profile in public opinion, its activist interaction with the legislature, and its tactical dialogue with the EU Court of Justice.

Keywords: Constitutional courts, judicial authority, judicial dialogue, European legal space, courts in politics, politics in courts

Suggested Citation

von Bogdandy, Armin and Paris, Davide, Building Judicial Authority: A Comparison Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court (January 10, 2019). Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2019-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3313641

Armin Von Bogdandy (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ( email )

Im Neuenheimer Feld 535
69120 Heidelberg, 69120
Germany

Davide Paris

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ( email )

Im Neuenheimer Feld 535
69120 Heidelberg, 69120
Germany

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