Does Analyst Coverage Affect Workplace Safety?

AFA 2019 Atlanta Meetings Paper; Forthcoming, Management Science

49 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2019 Last revised: 9 Jun 2021

See all articles by Daniel Bradley

Daniel Bradley

University of South Florida

Connie X. Mao

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management; Temple University - Department of Finance

Chi Zhang

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Date Written: January 11, 2019

Abstract

Consistent with the monitoring role of analysts, we find work-related injury rates are negatively related to higher levels of analyst coverage. This result is robust to approaches designed to mitigate endogeneity concerns and is stronger in industries where unions are less powerful, for firms followed by all-star analysts and in the presence of more local analysts. Firms with greater analyst coverage are more likely to adopt safety clauses in CEO compensation contracts, are rated higher in workplace safety culture, invest more in safety and management is more likely to discuss safety issues during earnings conference calls. Our results suggest analysts have a subtle yet important impact on employee welfare.

Keywords: workplace safety, employee welfare, analyst coverage, analyst monitoring, managerial incentive

JEL Classification: G24, G30, J28, K32

Suggested Citation

Bradley, Daniel and Mao, Connie X. and Zhang, Chi, Does Analyst Coverage Affect Workplace Safety? (January 11, 2019). AFA 2019 Atlanta Meetings Paper; Forthcoming, Management Science, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313851

Daniel Bradley

University of South Florida ( email )

Tampa, FL 33620
United States

Connie X. Mao

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

416 Alter Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-4895 (Phone)
215-204-1697 (Fax)

Temple University - Department of Finance ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-4895 (Phone)
215-204-1697 (Fax)

Chi Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Lowell ( email )

Pulichino Tong Building
Manning School of Business
Lowell, MA 01854
United States

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