Fighting Mobile Crime

42 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2019

See all articles by Rosario Crinò

Rosario Crinò

Catholic University of Milan

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF

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Date Written: January 2019

Abstract

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.

Keywords: crime, enforcement, Extradition, Fleeing, migration

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Crinò, Rosario and Immordino, Giovanni and Piccolo, Salvatore, Fighting Mobile Crime (January 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13424, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314042

Rosario Crinò (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Milan ( email )

1 Largo A. Gemelli
Milano (Milan), MI Milano 20123
Italy

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF ( email )

via de caniana 2
24127
Bergamo, BG 24127
Italy

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