Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Value: New Evidence from the M&A Market
26 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2019 Last revised: 26 May 2020
Date Written: February 11, 2020
New evidence from acquisition decisions suggests that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) may increase firm value when internal corporate governance is sufficiently strong. We document that, in Germany, firms with stronger ATPs, and particularly supermajority provisions, are better acquirers. Managers of high-ATP firms create value in acquisitions by making governance-improving deals. They are more likely to engage in acquisitions that reduce their own entrenchment level and less likely to invest in declining industries. Further, our empirical evidence is consistent with a short-termist interpretation. We show that takeover threats can induce myopic investment decisions, which ATPs can mitigate. They also lead managers to engage more often in value-creating long-term and innovative investing, and increase their sensitivity to investment opportunities. Our findings contribute to a growing literature challenging conventional wisdom that the agency-increasing effect of ATPs empirically dominates the myopia-eliminating effect, suggesting that a more contextual view of the value implications of ATPs is necessary.
Keywords: M&A, takeovers, corporate governance, antitakeover provisions, short-termism, firm value
JEL Classification: G30, G34, M21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation