Quantifying Long-Term Impact of Court Decisions

iCourts Working Paper Series No. 148

Forthcoming in Applied Network Science

13 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2019

See all articles by Jorge C. Leitao

Jorge C. Leitao

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts

Sune Lehmann

Technical University of Denmark

Henrik Palmer Olsen

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts

Date Written: January 15, 2019

Abstract

In this work, we investigate how court decisions aggregate citations in the European Court of Human Rights. Using the Bass model, we quantify the prevalence of the rich-get-richer phenomenon. We find that the Bass model provides an excellent description of how individual decisions accumulate citations. Our analysis reveals that citations to a large fraction of decisions are, in fact, explained by the rich-get-richer phenomenon. Based on our statistical model, we argue that network properties are insufficient to explain the rich-get-richer effect, suggesting that intrinsic properties of decisions drive a significant part of the observed citation patterns. We conclude by discussing the legal implications of our findings.

Keywords: Law; Citation Networks; Bass model; Preferential Attachment

Suggested Citation

Leitao, Jorge C. and Lehmann, Sune and Olsen, Henrik Palmer, Quantifying Long-Term Impact of Court Decisions (January 15, 2019). iCourts Working Paper Series No. 148, Forthcoming in Applied Network Science, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316002 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3316002

Jorge C. Leitao

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts

Studiestraede 6
Copenhagen, DK-1455
Denmark

Sune Lehmann

Technical University of Denmark ( email )

Anker Engelunds Vej 1
Building 101A
Lyngby, 2800
Denmark

Henrik Palmer Olsen (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts ( email )

Studiestraede 6
Copenhagen, DK-1455
Denmark

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