The Perils of Institutional Investors’ Diversification: Defying the Myth

52 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2019 Last revised: 2 Apr 2019

See all articles by Ittai Paldor

Ittai Paldor

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Date Written: January 15, 2019

Abstract

Institutional investors’ diversification strategy has become the “hot button” issue of corporate law, and the hallmark of their business strategy is under attack. Current scholarly work argues that when institutional investors cross-own firms, an anti-competitive outcome ensues. Importantly, the argument is that this is the case even if the diversified institutional investors have no control over the firms in which they invest, the investment is completely passive, and the (passive) investors do not coordinate in any way. This view has not only gained scholarly support, but has persuaded enforcement agencies. The agencies have reportedly begun to investigate instances of the phenomenon, and have even struck down mergers based on this theory of competitive harm. Since cross-holdings play a critical role in institutional investors’ ability to diversify their portfolio, the implications of these new analyses are far reaching. This Paper challenges the recent analyses. It argues that common ownership of firms by institutional investors is competitively benign. The theoretical argument is supported by very recent empirical findings.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Cross Ownership, Common Ownership, Horizontal Shareholding, Antitrust, Competition

JEL Classification: L10, L13, L22, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Paldor, Ittai, The Perils of Institutional Investors’ Diversification: Defying the Myth (January 15, 2019). Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 19-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3316111

Ittai Paldor (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

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