A New Consensus Protocol: Quadratic Voting With Multiple Alternatives

11 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2019 Last revised: 6 Apr 2019

See all articles by Jon X. Eguia

Jon X. Eguia

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research

Katrina Ligett

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Benin School of Computer Science and Engineering

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: April 4, 2019

Abstract

We study a voting scheme for multiple alternatives. Our scheme generalizes the two-alternative quadratic voting scheme of Lalley and Weyl. We prove that our generalization results in an outcome where the most-valued alternative wins, and that the vote totals order alternatives from most-to-least valued.

Keywords: Quadratic Voting, Voting Paradoxes, Duverger’s Law, Social Choice

JEL Classification: D61, D71

Suggested Citation

Eguia, Jon X. and Immorlica, Nicole and Ligett, Katrina and Weyl, Eric Glen and Xefteris, Dimitrios, A New Consensus Protocol: Quadratic Voting With Multiple Alternatives (April 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3319508 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319508

Jon X. Eguia

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research ( email )

One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Katrina Ligett

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Benin School of Computer Science and Engineering ( email )

Israel

Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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